![]() Server : Apache/2 System : Linux server-15-235-50-60 5.15.0-164-generic #174-Ubuntu SMP Fri Nov 14 20:25:16 UTC 2025 x86_64 User : gositeme ( 1004) PHP Version : 8.2.29 Disable Function : exec,system,passthru,shell_exec,proc_close,proc_open,dl,popen,show_source,posix_kill,posix_mkfifo,posix_getpwuid,posix_setpgid,posix_setsid,posix_setuid,posix_setgid,posix_seteuid,posix_setegid,posix_uname Directory : /home/gositeme/.cursor-server/data/User/History/-73b9ea70/ |
# 🔒 Security Vulnerabilities - File Access & Download **Date:** 2025-12-02 **Severity:** 🔴 **HIGH** **Status:** ⚠️ **NEEDS IMMEDIATE FIX** ## 🚨 Vulnerabilities Found ### 1. Path Traversal in File Downloads **Affected Files:** - `api/download_track.php` (line 70) - `api/download_crate_track.php` (lines 139-155) - `utils/play_audio.php` (line 237) - `utils/audiofiles_public.php` (line 48) **Issue:** File paths are constructed from database values (`audio_url`) without proper validation. If an attacker can manipulate the database or if stored values contain path traversal sequences (`../`), they could access files outside the intended directory. **Example Attack:** ```php // If audio_url in database is: "../../../etc/passwd" $file_path = $_SERVER['DOCUMENT_ROOT'] . parse_url($audio_url, PHP_URL_PATH); // Could result in: /var/www/html/../../../etc/passwd ``` **Risk:** - 🔴 **HIGH** - Unauthorized file access - Could expose sensitive files (config files, passwords, etc.) - Could allow reading arbitrary files on the server ### 2. Missing Session Check **Affected File:** - `utils/audiofiles_public.php` (line 35) **Issue:** `session_start()` is commented out, but the code still tries to use `$_SESSION['user_id']`. This could cause: - Undefined variable errors - Potential bypass of authentication checks - Inconsistent behavior **Risk:** - 🟡 **MEDIUM** - Authentication bypass potential - Could allow unauthorized access if session check fails ### 3. Insufficient Path Validation **Affected Files:** - All download handlers **Issue:** While `realpath()` is used in some places, it's not consistently applied, and paths aren't validated to ensure they're within allowed directories before using `realpath()`. **Risk:** - 🟡 **MEDIUM** - Path traversal still possible in edge cases ## ✅ Recommended Fixes ### Fix 1: Add Path Validation Function Create a secure path validation function that: 1. Validates paths are within allowed directories 2. Prevents path traversal 3. Normalizes paths safely ### Fix 2: Whitelist Allowed Directories Only allow file access from specific whitelisted directories: - `/audio_files/` - `/uploads/` - Other explicitly allowed directories ### Fix 3: Validate Database Values Before using `audio_url` from database: 1. Validate it matches expected patterns 2. Check it's within allowed directories 3. Sanitize any user-controlled input ### Fix 4: Fix Session Handling - Uncomment `session_start()` in `audiofiles_public.php` - Or remove session dependency if public access is intended - Add proper authentication checks ## 🎯 Priority Actions 1. **IMMEDIATE** - Fix path traversal vulnerabilities 2. **HIGH** - Add path validation to all file handlers 3. **MEDIUM** - Fix session handling in `audiofiles_public.php` 4. **MEDIUM** - Add comprehensive input validation ## 📝 Files Requiring Fixes 1. ✅ `api/download_track.php` - Add path validation 2. ✅ `api/download_crate_track.php` - Add path validation 3. ✅ `utils/play_audio.php` - Add path validation 4. ✅ `utils/audiofiles_public.php` - Fix session + path validation 5. ✅ `api/download_variation.php` - Review and add validation